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ABSTRACT: One of the traditional ways in which we manage dissensus is by argumentation, which may 
be construed as the attempt of the proponent to persuade rationally the other party of the truth (or 
acceptability) of some thesis. To achieve this, the arguer will often anticipate a possible objection.  In this 
paper, I attempt to shed light on the normative aspect of the task of anticipating objections.  I deal with such 
questions as: How is the arguer to anticipate objections? Which of the anticipated objections are to be dealt 
with? What is required to deal successfully with an objection?  
 
KEYWORDS: objection, standard objections. anticipating objections, dialectical tier, argumentative space, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the traditional ways in which we manage dissensus is by argumentation-- 
construed here as the attempt of the arguer to persuade the other (whom we may suppose 
to be unpersuaded but open at this point) of the truth (or acceptability) of his thesis. This 
activity of argumentation depends on their being (some) common ground—the parties 
must agree to (some) premises, must agree to certain modes of argumentation, forms, etc. 
The proponent may been seen as seeking to enlarge that common ground by getting the 
other (however conceived, whether it be an interlocutor, or an audience) to come around 
to accept the conclusion 
Dissensus often manifests itself in the form of the raising an objection, which may 
be seen as the person’s stating one kind of impediment to his or her accepting the 
argument. That being so, it is natural for the arguer to attempt to forestall the objection by 
anticipating and responding to it. That activity may lead to the construction of what I call 
the dialectical tier (2000), a phenomenon that is widespread in argumentative practice but 
which has not been much discussed in argumentation theory.1 
 
1  In Manifest Rationality (2000), I went further and made anticipating and dealing with objections --the 
dialectical tier--part of the very idea of argument. In that effort, I wanted to accomplish a number of things. 
First, I wanted to incorporate into the theory (here into the definition) what I found again and again 
represented in the practice but not reflected in the theory. Second, I wanted to fortify the conception of 
argument, out of the conviction that it had become flabby, attenuated (1986). Third, I wanted to bring to the 
fore an aspect of argument that had not hitherto been thematized: that an argument is not just a rational 
product (which almost everyone readily concedes), but one that is manifestly so, and that is why arguers do 
and must anticipate objections. 
RALPH H. JOHNSON 
In this paper, I attempt to provide shed some light on this task, particularly its 
normative aspects. How is the arguer to anticipate objections? Which of the anticipated 
objections is the arguer obliged to be deal with? What is required to deal successfully 
with the objections thus anticipated? What is dialectical excellence? I shall not here deal 
directly with the important question “Exactly what is an objection?”, other than to say it  
represents the articulation a proposition which might pose a problem for the argument’s 
success.2 
 
II. THE TASK OF ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS: THE WHY? 
 
Why does an arguer take the trouble to anticipate objections? Various rationales can and 
have been offered. For the most part these differences can be traced to one’s approach to 
argumentation theory. In the literature, it has become customary to discuss three basic 
approaches to argumentation: the logical, the dialectical and the rhetorical.3 Later I will 
attempt a more careful delineation of these approaches.  
  One who takes a rhetorical approach might tend to work this issue through in 
terms of the audience. For the arguer to construct the argument in the first place, he needs 
to know who he is trying to persuade. Who constitutes his audience?  The arguer must 
have some sense of the expectations of his audience to even begin the construction. Then 
he should ask: Which objections will they be aware of and want handled? In this vein, 
Hitchcock has suggested the following condition:4 
 
 The arguer is expected to deal with all those objections, which it may be reasonably supposed his 
audience will expect him to deal with. If you want to persuade your audience,5 you have to show 
that you can handle their objections. 
 
Among those who advocate a rhetorical approach are Wenzel (1989) and Tindale (1999). 
Those who take a dialectical approach6 will tend to focus on arguing as a 
                                                 
2  See Govier, 1999, Johnson 2001, Finocchiaro 2003. 
3  In 2004, I raised concerns about this tripartite distinction, both as to how it is drawn and its apparent 
exclusivity. 
4 In  Hitchcock's (unpublished) commentary on my 1996 OPS paper, Arguments and Dialectical Obligations. 
5  The goal as stated here is rational persuasion. In the first instance, it will be framed as the arguer to 
rationally persuade the Other/the addressee. But traffic on Persuasion Street flows in both directions; the 
addressee may persuade the arguer that the argument doesn’t work by formulating a criticism, which shows 
the arguer a weakness in the argument. This bidirectional orientation is one reason that argument cannot 
adequately be described as “an invitation to inference” (Pinto, 2001). (See my 2000, Chapter 8, where I 
discuss Johnstone Jr.’s views on bilaterality ) For if it is an “invitation,” it must be construed as more 
complex: as an invitation either to draw the inference or to indicate why you decline the invitation. The 
logic of an invitation must allow for the possibility of a “No thank you.” Otherwise, it is no invitation but 
rather a command, in which case we would have left the realm of argumentative space. Also, one can 
decline an invitation without giving a reason, though it is customary to cite one. And the reason one gives 
may be other than the reason one has; everyone understands this. Politeness and tact are factors here. These 
conditions do not seem hold sway in the realm of argument—at least as I conceive it, where the reasons one 
has to support and the reasons one gives must coincide—for reasons of manifestness. I have other 
reservations about the idea of argument as an invitation to inference, but they are not pertinent to matters 
under discussion here. 
6  The term “dialectical” is freighted with baggage. It is in wide use in argumentation theory: I have already 
mentioned Wenzel’s use; van Eemeren and Grootendorst adopted as part of the name for their pragma-
dialectical approach. I use it in MR to characterize, not an approach to argument, but to characterize a trait 
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process/activity that takes place between two parties. In this setting, it is important to be 
able to anticipate objections that one’s interlocutor might raise.7 This is a more-well 
defined task, because one will typically have “a reading” of one’s interlocutor. Some 
approaches come from a strategic direction: anticipating objections is just a good move to 
make.8  It helps to achieve the goal of persuasion, or of a critical discussion.9 Those who 
take the logical approach focus on the argument as product rather than arguing as process 
and sees this task as an important one in producing a good argument. More about this 
approach below. Some approaches are more empirically oriented: such an approach will 
argue that anticipating objections is what works… or, perhaps, if you do not anticipate 
objections, your argument will suffer (O’Keefe, 2002, 2006).  
                                                                                                                                                 
The approach that I take may be charcaterized as at once logical and pragmatic, is 
based on two considerations. First, my theory of argument is constructed around the goal 
of rational persuasion.10 The setting I foresee is what, following Haworth (2000) might 
be called the ethos of a seminar room. In this setting, which I later will characterize as in 
argumentative space, if you want to persuade other members of the seminar and you 
know that one of them is likely to raise a certain objection, then to achieve your goal you 
must deal with that objection, forestall it, as it were. The biologist, Francis Collins, refers 
to how well C.S. Lewis anticipated and dealt with his objections to faith: “I realized that 
all of my own constructs against the plausibility of faith were those of a schoolboy… 
Lewis seemed to know all of my objections, sometimes before I had quite formulated 
them. He invariably addressed them within a page or two” (Collins, 2006, 21). Here my 
justification has a rhetorical dimension.11 But there is a second justification that flows 
from my conception of argument as manifest rationality. An argument is a rational 
product through and through; it is an exercise in rationality in which the parties are 
interested in both the substance and the appearance of rationality (2000, 163-64). Not to 
acknowledge objections is, in most contexts, a failure not just of rationality but to make 
that rationality manifest. It will appear to be a failure, a lapse of rationality. To whom? To 
those to whom the argument is addressed. Thus, the task of anticipating and responding 
of the practice of argumentation itself. For some further reflections on this, see my (2004, 486ff). Then 
there is the term “dialogical’—this one perhaps easier to pin down. See Walton (1985) who refers to the 
work of Lorenz and Lorenzen, Barth and Krabbe. On the relationship between dialectical and dialogical, 
see Blair (1998), Finocchiaro (2003) and Govier (2006). 
7  In a sense, this task is otiose for those who take the pragma-dialectical approach. One need not anticipate 
one’s interlocutor’s objection, because the presumption is that one’s interlocutor will raise the objections he 
or she finds important. But this fact illustrates the point that there are more than cosmetic differences 
between approaches (Johnson, 1994).   
8 When I Googled the phrase “anticipate objections,” I found that at least half of the first 20 hits were to 
WebPages having to do with how to sell a product effectively. 
9  Strategic aims may dovetail with rhetorical ones, viz., the concept of strategic maneuvering as developed 
by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002). 
10  I cannot argue it here but I believe this purpose is the fundamental one and others (like justification, 
inquiry, reinforcement) can be generated from it. My strategy would be to mount an argument that parallels 
Wittgenstein’s’ argument that first we learn to talk to others, then to ourselves. We justify to others; then to 
self.  
11  The difference is that you cannot ask the Other what his objections are. Govier (1999) calls this Other 
“the non-interactive audience.”  
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to objections is part of the very rationality of the practice, and as well of making the 
rationality manifest.12 
 I now move to a discussion of the how and the why.  
 
III. THE TASK OF ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS: THE HOW 
 
How does one go about the task of anticipating an objection? This undertaking occurs 
naturally in the course of constructing one’s argument. In our text, Logical Self-Defense--
we advise the arguer to think about the possible objections his or her argument might face 
(2006, pp. 252-53).    Strange to say that while many authors recommend this step—
anticipate objections to your argument-- few give much detailed advice about how to do 
it. We tell our students that they must ”read the text carefully”—but this, as Moira 
Gutteridge once remarked, is no more helpful to the budding analyst than to say  “Play 
the piano beautifully’ is to the budding pianist (2006, p. 20). What can be done to help 
them learn how to read carefully? If we transfer to the current situation, the question is: 
What can be done to help them develop strategies for anticipating objections? 
  The simplest strategy, and the one that I suspect most follow, goes like this. Once 
one has formulated the essence of one’s argument [the illative core], one re-reads that 
argument with critical eye. Certain objections will perhaps “come to mind.” They will 
occur to one in that frame of mind; they will emerge in a voice that says: “But what 
about…?” One then puts these objections into words and responds to them (the dialectical 
tier).  
Another strategy is to put yourself in your opponent’s shoes and ask: what sorts of 
objections is he or she likely to bring? Sometimes to stock one’s imagination, one gives 
the argument to someone who, one thinks, will give it a close read; then gets their 
feedback that will include objections. These can then be included and replied to in what I 
have termed the dialectical tier (Johnson, 2000). One is thus able to “anticipate the 
objection,” because it has already been given voice.  
Perhaps even more effective is the step of immersing oneself in the issue and the 
various positions that have developed. That means becoming familiar with the dialectical 
environment of the argument—a construct I will offer an analysis of later. The better one 
knows the dialectical environment (up to point),13 the more successful one can be in 
anticipating various objections. Because one then knows what sorts of objections are 
around, what sorts of objections others have raised. One will be familiar with the 
alternative positions and possibly be able to immerse oneself in them in order to see how 
someone who holds that view might object. One can then make use one’s knowledge of 
similar argumentative situations to extrapolate to the current one.14 
 Typically some of this thinking occurs in the construction of the argument---so it 
is likely the dialectical environment will influence the arguer in the very formation of the 
argument. In the selection of one’s premises, one’s lines of argument, one may well have 
                                                 
12  Only recently have I become aware that my views here echo those of Habermas who thinks of argument 
in terms of its being patent, transparent (1984). I owe my awareness of this aspect of Habermas’s views to 
Bickenbach and Davies (2001). 
13 The reason for the qualifier is that knowledge and commitment often produce blinders not shared by 
some who comes to the issue less laden. 
14  Thanks to Hans V. Hansen for this suggestion.  
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in mind what is needed to stave off a certain objection. Possibly there will exist what are 
called standard objections,15 so those will have to be dealt with in the dialectical tier. In 
this way the illative core and dialectical tier interface. Someone might object (sic!) to my 
separation of the two by noting that even in the construction of core of one’s argument, 
one will often be taking into account potential objections, so that what I call the 
dialectical tier is, as it were, “folded in” to the illative core. Obviously, having just 
conceded this point, I agree. There is a dynamic interaction between the illative core and 
dialectical tier; this, however, does not render either superfluous.16 Indeed for there to be 
such a relationship, there must be a distinction. There have been attempts to develop 
more systematic approaches, like the one we (Johnson and Blair) developed in Logical 
Self-Defense (first in 2e, 1983). We recommend that one look for objections by focussing 
on the connection between the premises and the conclusion: Ask this question: Is there a 
way for the premises to be true and the conclusion false? Is there a counterexample? 
Another way to locate an objection is looking at the premises and asking if there are ways 
that they might be false. But there are problems with this approach. First, it is premised 
on what I call the (P+I) approach to argument analysis (2000, pp.75, 167). That is, it 
assumes the would-be anticipator has analyzed the argument in question into something 
like premise and conclusion form and has some sense of the inferential link between the 
premises and conclusion. I have some reservations about seeing the structure this way. 
First, it is not always easy to see the link—especially in arguments with a complex 
structure (sub-arguments). Second, this advice seems to come quite close to the strategy 
of deductive reconstruction—looking for a counterexample is looking for a possible 
situation in which the premises can be true and the conclusion false, this is in effect 
showing that the argument is invalid.17 But it seems to me unwise to build that standard 
into the very idea of argument construction. Third, my experience teaches me that most 
objections interdict the argument obliquely. That is, they rarely target a specific premise 
or a connection; at least as often they focus on some tacit element—an assumption, 
implication, presupposition or what have you.  
 In any event, the question of how to go about anticipating objections is crucial to 
the process of argumentation. It requires both skill and a certain imaginative flair, and it 
deserves far more attention from argumentation theorists than it has received thus far. 
My own sense is that we can get some clarity here by reflecting using 
argumentative space as a metaphor that will function as a prelude to my introduction of 
the idea of dialectical environment. 
 
IV. ARGUMENTATIVE SPACE AND THE DIALECTICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Introductory Comments 
 
Spatial metaphors occur commonly in the discourse about argument. We hear people 
speak of “the ground floor” or “the foundation” of the argument. We speak of an 
                                                 
15 To the best of my knowledge, there has never been a serious attempt to analyze this important notion. I 
will have a few suggestions in this paper, as well as some suggestions about the significance of this gap.  
16  Finocchiaro (2003) contains the most thorough dissection/criticism of my ideas regarding the dialectical 
tier.   
17  Godden (2005) argues that counterexampling does not necessarily have to invoke validity. 
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argument as being able to “withstand” objections that are directed at it---combining the 
spatial and mobile. Objections themselves can said to achieve a certain “prominence” or 
“salience. We ask whether the argument or position can be “rebuilt” so as to get around 
the criticism. Alternative positions are described as being “very far apart” or “close 
together.” Arguments jockey with one another for attention in “logical (dialectical) 
space.” Moreover, when we have to represent the structure of arguments, techniques like 
tree diagramming and Toulmin diagrams. Horne (1999) and Yoshimi (2005) combine 
spatial with diachronical modes.  
 I find the metaphor of argumentative space18 suggestive, and propose to use it 
here to see what heuristic value is has. There are several potential advantages to this 
metaphor. First, we can present argumentative space as a subspace within rational space 
and thereby differentiate argument from other types of rational products: theory, 
explanation, inference, etc. Second, the metaphor is flexible; it can be used to represent 
arguments statically, as I will tend to use it; or dynamically. Argument as event, process, 
activity or product, outcome can all be successfully explicated using this metaphor. (Also, 
I have found it a useful way to introduce students to the practice of argumentation.19) 
Third, and to the point here, the metaphor can be used to define the notion of the 
dialectical environment of an argument in which dialectical material accumulates. Among 
such material will be the objections that have been raised. That leads to the last potential 
advantage: we can offer an account of the standard objections as those that have achieved 
salience in the neighborhood of the argument, as I shall discuss later. 
 
Rational Space 
 
Since I regard argument as a manifestation of rationality, I begin with the notion of 
rational space. By "rational space," I mean to characterise the area in which occurs the 
activities and the results of the activities (inquiry or discourse) in which “rationality 
rules”; i.e., in which some rules (or principles or requirements of rationality) are 
acknowledged as having determinative (more or less) of the events that transpire in that 
space and their resolution. It is rational space because reasons and reasons alone have 
regulative force. It is not thereby denied that exchanges will have other dimensions--
rhetorical, emotional—just that these do not play a determinative role in the 
evaluation/criticism/resolution of these activities and products. (For the moment, I am 
assuming nothing more than a bares-bones conception of rationality as was discussed in 
MR, pp. 12-14.) 
                                                 
18 Herewith a brief history of this notion. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Wittgenstein 
introduced the notion of logical space to help explain the relationship between language and the world, 
between propositions and facts. In the informal logic movement, the idea of representing the structure of 
arguments spatially has a long history stretching back at least as far as Monroe Beardsley (1963) and thence 
forward to Thomas’s adaptation, Scriven’s tree diagramming methods, etc. Somewhat closer to the sense in 
which it is used in the present inquiry are Barth’s notion of a dialectical field (1993) and Tindale’s notion 
of a cognitive environment (1999). Parallel to my concerns, Govier (1999) makes use of the idea of space to 
define an alternative position as one which competes with another in what she calls “intellectual and social 
space.” 
19  I tell them:  “When you enter argumentative space, there are certain rules that have to be followed: such 
as:  “You must direct your attack to the argument, not the arguer. Attack the strongest plausible version of 
the argument Your must provide support for your claims.” Etc. Inevitably we will have the discussion about 
such questions as: Who says these are the rules? Who gets to make the rules? 
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 For example, problem-solving is an activity/event/process that occurs in rational 
space.  A problem is defined or set, solutions to it are proposed, and the merits of alternative 
solutions are weighed in terms of their capacity to solve the problem (and, of course, other 
things such as their implications and consequences).  In this activity, those involved 
typically do not consult (or at least they would say that they do not consult) other factors, 
such as their personal feelings about the proposer of the solution, nor yet how well written is 
the prose in which the solution is presented (though in some other endeavour, it might well 
be crucial to take such factors into account).  Even things which ordinarily might be taken 
into account, such as the motivation behind the proposed solution, do not really matter in 
rational space. That is, they are understood to have no effect on the outcome.  Much of 
science and mathematics, may be construed as problem-solving activity that occurs in 
rational space. Theories must gain their acceptance or rejection independent of the 
personality of the proposers and any associated emotions or feelings they might raise. For 
example, it was widely known that J. B. Watson was a something of a cad yet this truth 
about him was simply not a factor in deciding whether or not to accept his proposal 
regarding the structure of DNA. It may be that Stephen Hawking’s health problems have 
been inspiring to the wider public, but it would be very surprising to learn that feelings of 
empathy have had any determinative role in the evaluation of his views in the scientific 
community. Imagine a physicist saying to a colleague: “Poor Hawking: he’s in a bad way, 
so let’s give him a lift and accept his theory.” No: his scientific work is judged by the very 
same standards as any other scientist’s. He receives no special consideration because of his 
infirmity (though he might well get such in other circumstances, viz., at the hospital). Most 
of the disciplines take place in rational space.20  Examples of communications not in rational 
space would be: the speeches given by political candidates, advertising. 
We can also distinguish between rational space and emotional space. To make 
such a demarcation does not commit me to the view that there is an inherent and 
unalterable tension between Reason and Emotion, nor yet between these two types of 
space.  It is rather to mark that they are different. In emotional space, the need to vent or 
share or explore or own one’s or others emotional states, reactions, processes is 
primary.21 Therapeutic transactions are typically situated in emotional space where the 
point is not to think, but to feel. Thus the directive: “Get out of your head.”   And there 
are spaces that are mixed.  For examples of arguments in mixed spaces, I would point to  
political speeches where the rational, emotional and rhetorical must be woven together; 
the “Letters to the Editors” page of the newspaper,22 and as well to what Gilbert ((1997) 
calls “kisceral” and “visceral argumentation.”23   
                                                 
20 One of the most compelling indications arises from the fact that most journals adopt the policy of blind 
refereeing precisely to eliminate potential biases arising from knowledge of the identity of the author (ethos). 
21  To be sure cognition is at work here but the telos is an emotional result, not a cognitive one; though 
many believe that a cognitive one must precede (or accompany). 
22 See the advice to letter writers given by Paul Russell who edits The National Post “Letters to the Editor” 
section. The National Post, January 15, 2007, A15. He writes: “Appeal to reader’s emotions….Last week, 
for example, we carried a handful of passionate letters from parents of children with Downs syndrome. 
Readers sent in notes saying they were moved to tears by these letters, which stimulated both the heart and 
the mind.”. 
23I question whether the focus of Gilbert’s theory is best described as argumentation. It seems to me that his 
focal point is better described as communication, a much broader category. There will be justified 
expectations and norms that apply to some forms of communication (a conversation) that will not apply to 
argumentation. 
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Naturally the question will be asked: what are the rules that govern conduct in 
rational space?  And what are the criteria to be applied to the products that emerge?  The 
general rule would be that reasons (and reasons alone) play the dominant role in rational 
space. More particular rules will be a function of the particular area of rational space that the 
particular activity or inquiry occurs within. The rules that one must abide by in solving a 
mathematical problem are slightly different than those which one must abide by in physics 
and so on.  I have said earlier that the setting I envisage is the seminar room, where issues 
are discussed, arguments presented. Each discipline, and perhaps each sub-discipline, may 
be characterised as having such rules, procedures and criteria. It must be acknowledged that 
some developments within the discipline are not mandated by these rules and methods. The 
space in which our disciplines operate probably cannot be characterised as completely 
rational. But in the seminar room it is the force of one’s reasons and argumentation--and that 
alone-- that is judged relevant to the outcome. 
 These comments form the background for my discussion of argumentative space. 
 
Argumentative Space 
 
One important subspace with rational space is argumentative space. Clearly, rational space 
is broader than argumentative space as there are all sorts of rational processes, events, 
products that are not argument.  To take the stock example: explanation (see Govier, 1987; 
Johnson & Blair, 1983). A more controversial example would be inference. Many conflate 
argument with inference, but I have argued that such conflation is a serious (deeply 
engrained) mistake (2000, 92-94).24  When one is attempting to draw an inference to the 
best explanation, one is certainly in rational space, for one is considering factors such like 
simplicity and coherence. But that does not thereby put one into argumentative space. The 
goal and criteria of evaluation are different for an explanation. Simplicity is a criterion for 
evaluating an explanation, but not for an argument. 
 By argumentation, I mean to denote a special area that lies within rational space 
where rationality is especially important. To understand this area of rational space, it 
necessary to situate argumentation within its proper context: the practice of argumentation. 
By "the practice of argumentation," I mean to refer to socio-cultural activity of constructing, 
presenting, interpreting, analyzing, criticising and revising arguments.25  This activity 
cannot be understood as the activity of any individual or group of individuals, but rather 
must be understand within the network of customs, habits and activities of the broader 
society which gives birth to it, which continues to maintain it and which the practice 
serves.26  I want to use the metaphor which sees all of this occurring within a subspace of 
rational space that is argumentative space.  
                                                
 As I mentioned in Section II There are various approaches to/perspectives on the 
study of argumentation. Many theorists, follow Wenzel (1989) in distinguishing three: the 
 
24 See Finocchiaro (2005: 311-313) for his critique of my views. 
25 I gratefully acknowledge the Commentary by Maurice Finocchiaro for drawing my attention to this lapse 
which has been repaired here in the final version but which did not appear in the version on which he 
commented. 
26 See my (2000: 154-56) for more discussion of this matter. 
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rhetorical, dialectical and logical.27 According to Wenzel, the rhetorical approach focuses 
on procedure, which in turn brings into the picture the audience. The role of argument in 
effective communication28 when is an argument an effective argument?  The dialectical 
approach focuses largely on the process and on arguing as an interpersonal activity 
(dialogue) and seek to develop rules that govern these activities. The logical approach has 
traditionally been focused on the argument as a product that emerges in the process of 
inquiry and rational persuasion; logic is particularly interested in the normative issues such 
as: What are the criteria of a good argument? There are other approaches (empirical, 
linguistic) but these are the three that I am interested in here. My characterization of 
argumentative space proceeds from the perspective of logic. Those who adopt the rhetorical 
perspective will likely have a different characterization; and those who take the dialectical 
approach a still different one.  Thus, one of the values of this metaphor is that it offers a 
convenient vehicle whereby these approaches can be differentiated. That is, a rhetorician 
will construe argumentative space differently from the logician.29 
 Let us think, then, of an argument as a position established at a particular location 
in argumentative space. The location will be determined largely by the conclusion of the 
argument which will indicate what issue is being addressed.30  By the issue, I mean to 
characterize in the  general terms the topic or focus, which can typically be phrased this 
way: “whether or not p”—where  p is a proposition—typically one that states what is the 
case or what should be done. By a position I mean a reasoned point of view on the 
issue—typically an argument that provides reasons for the conclusion. Take the issue of 
whether or not there is a God. Classically there are three positions: theism--which 
defends the view that there is God; atheism--which defends the view that there is no God; 
and agnosticism--which defends the view that we cannot know whether there is or is not. 
Now the arguments that have been developed to support theism are varied. Thus, Anselm 
defends theism using what is called the ontological argument. Descartes presents his own 
version of the ontological argument which bears some resemblance to Anselm’s; Aquinas 
presents five quite different arguments for the existence of God--none of them an 
ontological one. These can all be mapped as locations in argumentative space.31  
                                                 
27I have some problems with the distinction (process, procedure, product) used by Wenzel in his 
explanation of the distinction. My own view about this tripartite distinction is found in my (2004). 
28 In saying this I am aware of the enormous difficulties of giving an account of “the rhetorical point of 
view” or “perspective. There is no non-controversial way to draw this distinction nor yet to characterize the 
rhetorical approach  
29 In (1997) I attempted to distinguish between the logical and the rhetorical approaches, using the 
metaphor of argumentative space. 
30 See Goodwin (2004) on the importance of this concept and how much in need of thoughtful attention it 
is. Two additional points. First, whether X is an issue or not can be controversial. Some wish to say that 
whether or not there was a holocaust is an issue—but that view has not been generally persuasive 
(Haworth, 1998). Second, how the issue is to be formulated can be problematic, often itself becoming “the 
issue.” 
31 I have mentioned the fascinating and important work done by Horn, “Mapping Great Debates: Can 
Computers Think?” (1998). In another article, “Teaching Philosophy with Argumentation Maps,” 
Newsletter of the American Philosophical Association (November 2000), he writes: “The main structure of 
our maps is that of a large tree with many branches. (See Fig. 1) The tree begins with Turing's claim, 
quoted above. The structure is then quite simple. It proceeds by laying out the branches of claim, rebuttal, 
and counterrebuttal. One of our criteria for mapping the debates was that if there was no debate, the claim 
did not make it on to the charts. Such agreements are most often found in the sidebars on our maps.” Horn 
9 
RALPH H. JOHNSON 
As an element in the position, the argument will have its own structure and 
content. The premises may be said to point in the direction of the conclusion, to move us 
toward the conclusion. I have argued that typically an argument must have a dialectical 
tier in which the arguer confronts dialectical material, such as objections or criticisms 
directed at the argument, as well as observations, questions. This material can be 
represented graphically as being in the neighborhood of the argument and directed at it. 
Shortly I will present a proposal regarding the classification of this material. 
 An argument that concludes that gun control laws should be strengthened is in the 
same general area of argumentative space as one that concludes that gun control laws 
should not be strengthened. Among the neighbors will be other arguments bearing on the 
same issue that defend a different conclusion. These will be alternative positions. The 
space around the gun control issue will perhaps abut that about violence, but be located in 
a very different region than arguments about whether there should be a tax cut, and all of 
these in a very different region than arguments about whether the external world exists.  
 
 The Dialectical Environment  
 
By “the dialectical environment” of an argument, I mean to refer to the dialectical 
material (objections, criticisms, alternative positions, etc) that congregates around an 
issue. It is a sub-partitioning of argumentative space. Take, for example, the issue of 
whether or not same sex marriage should be legal in Canada. A mapping of the dialectical 
environment surrounding this issue would require us to lay out the various positions, the 
objections and criticisms of those positions, the responses to them. Obviously the map 
will be complex and constantly changing, and no individual has anything other than a 
more or less accurate up-to-date map at any given moment. The map will change over 
time, as some objections loom larger, gain advocacy and presence, while others lose 
some. As arguers continue to weigh in, new positions will be introduced into the 
environment, and perhaps some older ones will recede or disappear. In all this, some 
objections achieve salience—a property that needs to be better understood that I discuss 
later.  
A pivotal notion in understanding the dialectical environment is that of the issue. 
Every argument addresses some issue (I). The issue can usually be put in the form of a 
“whether or not …” formulation: whether or not there is a God; whether or not we should 
have invaded Iraq. The arguer will put forth an argument in which he outlines his 
position. Likely the arguer will be aware of at least some alternative positions (so these 
may be pictured as part of the dialectical environment) and as closer or further removed 
from the argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
has chosen to focus on mapping debates—a close analog to what I am engaged in here. His use of the 
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Issue (Whether or not there is a God) 
 
position1                         position2                         position 3 
theism                         agnosticism                          atheism 
 
Arg1       Arg2                         Arg3          Arg4                                 Arg5     Arg6 
 
        O1                                           O3                                                        O4 
 
                         O2                                                                                                             O5 
FIGURE 1 
The arguer may also be aware of certain objections that may be raised against his position 
--some of which will come from those who have adopted an alternative position. 
Once the argument has been sent into argumentative space (a public sphere), it 
may well attract attention and occasion objections and/or criticisms.32 So the dialectical 
environment surrounding an issue and surrounding a specific location may well consist of 
various kinds of dialectical material: objections that have been raised, alternative 
positions on the issue (in which that arguer may make reference to the argument), and 
criticisms, among others. In some cases, the dialectical environment is empty. In such a 
case, the arguer’s dialectical obligations are nil. It remains an important task to have a 
useful inventory of the types of dialectical material.33  
 With these considerations in mind, we can now turn to the normative issues. 
 
V. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS: THE NORMATIVE ISSUES 
 
There are two normative issues that the arguer faces in anticipating an objection. First, 
what are the arguer’s obligations in this matter? What objection(s) may he or she be 
reasonably expected to have anticipated? Second, what is required to discharge that 
obligation? Maybe it is better to think less in terms of dialectical adequacy and more in 
terms of dialectical excellence at this level. What does dialectical excellence look like? 
What would an argument that did a really good job of anticipating and responding to 
objections look like? Strange to say that we have no important types of argument 
paradigms of this. Certainly the old war-horse: “All men are mortal, Socrates is a man; 
                                                                                                                                                 
Toulmin scheme is somewhat limiting for those of us who have problems with its fundamental architecture. 
32  In my (2002) I distinguish between an objection and a criticism 
33  I made such an attempt in my (2001). 
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therefore Socrates is mortal” whatever its other merits are — when viewed from the 
perspective of manifesting how the arguer deals with his dialectical obligations — is 
useless. 
One theorist who has given attention to these matters is Trudy Govier who has 
urged a position that she calls “pragmatic minimalism.” Let’s start with that. 
 
Govier’s Pragmatic Minimalism 
 
Govier says: 
 
In the meantime, we might adopt a pragmatic minimalist version of Johnson’s account, to good 
pedagogical and personal effect. Minimally, we might stipulate that when a person puts forward an 
argument for a claim C, he or she should, in addition to checking the argument for cogency, 
discover or construct one alternative position to C, one objection to C, and one objection to the 
argument for C; think these through these objections and that alternative fairly and carefully; and 
seek to respond to them as thoroughly and carefully as possible. (238) 
 
What Govier has provided is a kind of template for achieving dialectical adequacy. Yet I 
have some difficulties with her position, for three reasons.  
First, her position is developed in terms of her theory of objections with which I 
have some disagreement. For one thing, I suspect that responding to an objection to a 
conclusion will turn out to be not substantially different from responding to an alternate 
position. In which case, this requirement is possibly redundant. Second, her pragmatic 
minimalism makes no provision for differing types or strength of the objection, for the 
quite real possibility of that there will be priority relations among them; i.e., some 
objections are “stronger” than others and thus, it seems to me, have a stronger claim on 
the arguer’s attention. What about so-called standard objections? It is reasonable to 
expect the arguer to be aware of them and to respond to them—but her account makes no 
provisions for this. Also: If there should be a well-known objection (even if it is not one 
of the standard objections), the arguer has an obligation to deal with it. Third, her 
stipulation seems somewhat arbitrary (a charge she has made against my position): why 
one rather than two objections?  
 Let me, then, propose an alternative account of dialectical strength that involves 
providing answers to what I take to be the two central questions.  
 
 Q1: What are the arguer’s obligations?  
 
 In the matter of determining the arguer’s obligations, a number of issues are 
involved. What is the basis of this obligation? What kind of obligation is it: epistemic? 
deontological? prudential? There is also the objection that goes this way: It is not possible 
to have a policy or principle here that will cover all situations. For the most important 
factor is context. Some might say:  “It all depends….” on context. Leff has made just 
such an objection (1999), and many others have echoed it. But I don’t think it all depends 
on context, that these matters are all so situationally specific as to prohibit the possibility 
of general standards, which is what I am attempting to provide here.   
Suppose for a moment we invoke the now out-of-fashion military terminology, 
thinking of an objection as an attempted strike against the position. The need to anticipate 
and defend against depends on how much force the volley has, which is partly a function 
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of where it is launched from (the further the less likely to cause harm) and its own 
inherent strength (its capacity to destroy). Both proximity and strength are factors to be 
considered in determining one’s dialectical obligations. If the volley comes from very far 
away, I may safely ignore it, since it is unlikely to strike the target. If the volley is weak, 
then even if it hits it will not do serious damage so again I may safely and reasonably 
ignore it. An important feature that combines both strength and proximity is salience: 
“how large” the objection looms in the dialectical environment.  
 Thus my rough analysis suggests the following as factors in determining one’s 
dialectical obligations: (i) strength: the stronger the objection is, the stronger its claim on 
the arguer; (ii) proximity—the closer it is to the arguer’s position, the stronger its claim 
on the arguer; (iii) salience—the more salient the objection in the dialectical environment, 
the stronger its claim on the arguer to respond. These claims depend upon my being able 
to “translate out” from the metaphor—a task for the future. 
 There is an undeniably epistemic dimension to this issue. In anticipating 
objections, the arguer cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate and deal with every 
possible objection. The arguer is certainly going to be limited by his or her knowledge of 
the dialectical environment. No one can be aware of all the arguments that might be 
pertinent. Still it is always possible that the arguer is unaware of an objection that, we 
want to say, he or she should have been aware of. 
 It is possible that the argument has raised a new issue, so that there are no 
standard objections and no well-known ones. Then that part of the dialectical 
environment will be unoccupied.  
 
Q2:  What is required for the successful dispatch of one’s dialectical obligations? 
What is dialectical excellence? 
 
 To answer this question, it is helpful to reflect on an example. In The World We 
Want, Mark Kingwell is discussing The Universal Declaration of Human Rights--a 
document of produced by the United Nation in 1988. It included the provision that “the 
will of the people will be the basis of all legitimate government…and that will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections” (48-49). He writes: “Perhaps anticipating 
objections that would soon be leveled against this so-called rights discourse by various 
anti-liberal critics, the Declaration also articulates the responsibilities and duties of 
humans living in society” (49). Here Kingwell is imagining that critics of the Declaration 
might raise the following objection: “You speak of rights, but you nowhere speak of the 
duties and responsibilities of human living in society.”  
 In the background here, there have been numerous exchanges between the various 
points of view on this matter in which advocates of human rights have been challenged 
with this line of objection. Hence the objection--you ignore duties—apparently has 
achieved a certain prominence. Once this has happened we expect anyone who argues 
about this issue to address this sort of objection. In doing so, the arguers are engaged in 
constructing a dialectical tier for their argument. That dialectical tier consists has two 
elements. For each objection that is given voice, the arguer must first state that objection. 
Then the arguer must respond satisfactorily, or well, to that objection, provided he wishes 
to maintain his position over against the objection. What does this entail?  
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 I maintain then that excellence requires the satisfaction of three requirements 
Johnson, 2003, 2006). First, the arguer must accurately and faithfully state the 
objection—the danger here being the fallacy of straw person. It can be extremely hard to 
get right the objection which you think doesn’t hit the mark. Second, the arguer must 
make an adequate response; i.e., must argue that the objection is not on target, does not 
really damage the argument. (There are other alternatives, to be sure. See my (2006) for 
fuller treatment of this point.) Because this response will itself be an argument, its 
adequacy can be judged by the criteria one uses for argument evaluation. There is a 
difficult issue here. Let me quote Finocchiaro’s way of putting it. He says that: “… to be 
really good, an argument should also have the resources to answer or refute subsequent 
objections” (2005, 320). Now the question that is vexing me could be put this way: What, 
precisely, are the resources that an argument has with which it must answer or refute 
objections? Clearly, the arguer cannot just repeat, or shuffle and deal again, the premises 
of the argument in question, under pain of begging the question. So the arguer will have 
to use some additional material, but what sort of material is he entitled to use? What 
restrictions are there on this additional material? Let’s characterize this additional 
resource material as R1R2R3…Rn. It’s clear that no Ri may contradict any of the 
arguer’s stated or implicit premises. And it must be the case that the additional Ri do not, 
when invoked, make or require any essential chance to the argument as originally 
presented. For the whole idea of rejecting the objection is that one can show it to be 
invalid. Thus the argument stands as is. But one cannot achieve that if one makes any 
substantial change to the original argument. So those two conditions strike me as clear 
constraints on the use of additional material. I am sure there is more to be said. 
There is, however, a third component: the objection(s) anticipated must be 
appropriate. By that I mean that if the arguer deals with several objections but fails to 
give voice to a well-known and important objection (one that is salient/looms large in the 
dialectical environment)—then the arguer’s response, even if it satisfies the accuracy and 
adequacy requirements, is not rationally satisfying because the arguer has omitted/failed 
to deal with an objection which, it can reasonably be claimed, he ought to have dealt 
with. 
Thus I arrive at the following criteria for dialectical adequacy. The arguer, in his 
response to those objections s/he is obliged to deal with, must satisfy the three 
requirements of accuracy, adequacy34 and appropriateness (2003). One might think these  
matters of degree, in which case dialectical excellence would mean that the argument 
does an excellent job of satisfying all three requirements, or is dialectically strong when it 
is strong on each criterion. 
My final point is to ask the question: why has it taken so long for these issues to 
emerge? And why did it take informal logicians to raise them? I leave these questions for 
another occasion. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, a number of questions and issues requiring attention have emerged: The 
primary ones are these: 
                                                 
34  I think this unhappy terminology here, using “adequacy” to refer to the criterion and also a dimension of 
it. Which is one reason to favour excellence as the generic title. 
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How is the arguer to anticipate objections? 
Why should the arguer undertake this task?  
What constitutes dialectical adequacy/excellence? 
 
In their wake a number of ancillary questions also have arisen: 
 
What is an objection? 
What kinds of objections are there? 
How are we to understand the standard objections?  
How does an objection become a standard? 
 
I have introduced the ideas of argumentative space and dialectical environment to help 
answer these questions; and more recently, the idea that objections have proximity, 
strength and salience--all of which notions are at this point more metaphor than 
developed doctrine. Can these metaphors factors be successfully translated out/cashed in? 
 It is obvious that this paper has been more an exploration of these issues than an 
attempt at their resolution; serious reflection on these matters being still largely in its 
infancy. While there have been thorough and ongoing inquires into e.g., the nature of 
argument, into what makes for a good argument, whether there is a type of inference 
other than deductive and inductive (the hunt for “a third way”), matters having to do with 
dialectical adequacy have gone largely unattended. Questions such as what is an 
objection, what makes for a good objection, a strong objection, and what for a good 
response— which are dealt with on a regular basis in part of argumentative practice have 
not been adequately theorized. At the very least my hope is that this paper will cause 
others to take these matters in hand. 
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